In the era of artificial intelligence, more and more enterprises cooperate with universities to form a collaborative innovation alliance for the integration of industry and education. In this paper, using the evolutionary game theory, we establish the payment matrix of the collaborative innovation game led by the government, led by universities, and participated by enterprises, and carry out the analysis of replicated dynamic equations and stability of equilibrium points to construct the evolutionary game model of the integration of industry and education with the participation of multiple subjects. Through numerical example analysis, the role of different factors on the evolutionary equilibrium and the behavioral strategies of each game subject is explored. The results show that the evolution of industry-industry integration increases with the increase of the willingness of enterprises and universities to participate, and when the willingness to participate is greater than 0.5, the evolution of industryindustry integration tends to be 1. In addition, the enthusiasm of the university and enterprises to participate in the co-construction increases with the increase of the cooperation benefits created by the input resources, and the scientific and reasonable distribution coefficients of the cooperation benefits can help to increase the willingness to cooperate of the main subjects. In the R&D stage and the production and commercialization stage, when the penalty is greater than 6.25~6.5 and 4~6 respectively, it is easy to lead to the deep integration of the university and enterprise sides. In order to ensure the construction of the integration of industry and education, it is recommended to establish a complete information channel, design a good incentive-punishment mechanism, as well as improve the policies and regulations of the integration of industry and education, so as to promote the optimization and development of the organizational form of the integration of industry and education.
