This paper introduces an evolutionary game model for path optimization research based on the possibility of maximizing the interests of multiple participants. Through Nash equilibrium and replicated dynamics equations, it explores the evolutionary stabilization strategy of multi-party satisfaction. Taking the electricity market transaction as an example, the assumption conditions and payment functions are set to analyze the strategy evolution under the mutual game of thermal power enterprises, green power enterprises and power grid companies. Combined with simulation experiments, the evolutionary effect of the constructed evolutionary game model is verified. The results show that during the evolutionary game, the equilibrium return is stabilized at 8.758*105 yuan after 140 iterations for the grid company, 3.39*105 yuan after 68 iterations for the green power enterprise, and 4.44*105 yuan after 49 iterations for the thermal power enterprise. The carbon price is increased from 50 yuan/t to 90 yuan/t, and the market clearing tariff is correspondingly increased from 0.12 yuan/kWh to 0.91 yuan/kWh. Corresponding changes in the probability of selection of the 2 types of firms by the grid company. By adjusting the 2 parameters of thermal power price sensitivity coefficient and green power price sensitivity coefficient, the decision-making evolution of the 3 market transaction participants possesses stability.
