Effective games in the interaction of international relations provide a feasible path for maximizing national interests. This paper introduces evolutionary game theory into the study of interactive behavior in international relations, and analyzes the game strategy influencing factors from three aspects: subject assumptions, research methods and research objects, and opponent’s certainty. Using Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium strategy, the interactive decision-making process of peer-to-peer non- and master-slave non-cooperative games is calculated. Combining the rule of imitating the best player, the rule of replicating dynamics and the rule of Fermi updating, the strategies of the game players are adjusted to optimize the benefits. Taking the US-China energy bilateral trade game as an example, we construct a model of the influencing factors of the game strategies, analyze the current situation of the interests, and propose a method to reach the cooperative equilibrium of the game. The results show that the five influencing factors of the US-China energy game are politics>policy>technology>resources>culture. The score of China’s energy trade game strategy is 0.88, higher than that of the U.S. 0.83. During the period of 2018-2023, the energy dependence degree of both China and the U.S. exceeds 40%, which is one of the reasons leading to the choice of competitive game.
