The rapid development of online cab platforms has formed a great impact on the traditional cab industry, and there is both competition and cooperation between the two. In the case of overflow of orders from online taxi platforms, cab behavior has a significant impact on the construction of subsidy strategy of online taxi platforms. Based on bilateral market theory and evolutionary game theory, this study establishes a subsidy strategy model of online cab platform considering cab behavior, and explores the influence mechanism of cab behavior on subsidy strategy of online taxi platform in the case of order overflow of online taxi platform. The equilibrium points and stability of the game among the net booking platform, cab companies and passengers are analyzed by constructing replicated dynamic equations and Jacobi matrices. The results of the study show that: under the dynamic pricing strategy of online taxi platform, the price rises gradually with the increase of demand, and it can effectively balance the relationship between supply and demand; the cab price is significantly higher in the case of order overflow than in the case of no overflow, indicating that the overflow orders provide support for the cab price; the profit of online taxi is lower than that of centralized decision-making under the decentralized decision-making, and the profit shows a tendency to increase firstly and then decrease when the quality of the service improves; in the competing environment, the When the competitiveness of NetJourney cars and cabs is similar and the degree of competition is moderate, the two can realize stable coexistence. The study suggests that a reasonable platform subsidy strategy can promote the synergistic development of NetJourney cars and cabs, optimize the market structure, and improve the service experience of passengers, and the platform should dynamically adjust the subsidy according to the market supply and demand, and establish a sound competition mechanism.
